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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of the imposition of an interest rate ceiling in the microfinance 
sector in Cambodia in 2017, based on a household survey undertaken in 2019. Evidence 
indicates that the average interest rate was reduced after the imposition of the ceiling. Although 
this reduction is partially offset by the increase of the average loan assessment and processing 
fee, the average effective interest rate (i.e., credit cost) declined. The results also show the 
increase in the average loan size from formal sources at a relatively small level and the 
increase in the percentage of loans from informal sources by a few percentage points. 
Moreover, we find that relatively low-income households face a higher probability of being 
rejected for loans and a higher debt service ratio is positively associated with a larger loan 
amount. This implies the possibility of the increase of the debt burden occurring among 
relatively small borrowers, given that an increase of the average loan size at relatively small 
loan levels is observed. The evidence supporting the important role of financial literacy in 
reducing household debt burden is also confirmed. 
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Many people in developing countries, and especially those in low-income groups, still have little 
or no access to formal financial services (i.e., savings, borrowing, and other financial 
transactions). Generally, financial institutions such as conventional commercial banks may be 
reluctant to engage in financial activities with low-income groups due to the high risks and high 
unit costs resulting from their lack of collateral and the small transaction sizes. As an effort to 
combat poverty and improve people’s living standards, providing them access to financial 
services is believed to be a good approach and has been enhanced by many developing countries. 
Actually, microfinance has played an important role in this process of financial inclusion. 
Microfinance, which may include microcredit, microsavings, and microinsurance, is defined as 
financial services to the poor, low-income groups, and small businesses. Although the history of 
microfinance (particularly microcredit) can be traced back for centuries, the emergence of its 
significant role in the developing world occurred in the 1970s and 1980s in countries like Brazil, 
Bangladesh, and Indonesia and, at present, it is believed that the number of institutions engaging 
in microfinance activities worldwide has reached 10,000 or more (Watkins 2018). 
Like many other developing countries, microfinance is also an important element of the 
Cambodian financial sector. In 2019, while there were 47 commercial banks and 15 specialized 
banks, a few hundred financial institutions were engaging in microfinance activities in 
Cambodia. These microfinance institutions (MFIs) consist of 6 deposit-taking microfinance 
institutions, 76 non-deposit taking microfinance institutions, and 245 rural credit institutions, 
based on data published by NBC (2020). The total credit provided has increased rapidly from 
some million USD in 1995 to over 7 billion USD in 2019, which is approximately one fourth of 
the total credit provided in Cambodia.1 The total number of borrowers of MFIs has now reached 
about two million. This number is more than three times that of commercial banks (World Bank 
                                            





2019). While ability to access financial services through MFIs might help the poor to escape 
poverty and to improve their living standards, there are also concerns such as the high debt 
burden, possibly resulting from high borrowing costs or high loan interest rates in the 
microfinance sector, as discussed in Schicks (2010) and Liv (2013). Actually, relatively high 
interest rates in the microfinance sector have been criticized since the late 1970s, and this 
criticism has increased over the past decade, as illustrated by Rosenberg et al. (2009). Many 
microfinance activities have been transformed from charity-like arrangements to more 
commercial ones. This has resulted in concerns regarding the double bottom line issue in the 
microfinance sector (Watkins 2018). That is, while helping the poor and low-income 
communities through financial services has been a main mission for MFIs, generating financial 
returns for their shareholders or investors has also become their mission as commercial entities.2 
In an attempt to protect borrowers, the policy regulating the maximum legal loan interest rate has 
been adopted by both developed and developing countries such as Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Chile, Kenya, India, South Africa, and the USA. Ferrari et al. (2018) provided a detailed 
documentation of countries adopting this policy. Similarly, in Cambodia, concerns regarding the 
relatively high interest rate in microfinance sector led to the imposition of a legal interest rate 
ceiling on microfinance loans to 18% per annum in April 2017. According to NBC (2017), the 
imposition of the interest rate ceiling is for protecting consumers from excessive interest rate 
charged by MFIs and for enhancing affordable loan. This ceiling is effective for not only a new 
loan contract, but also a restructured loan and a refinance loan contract. 
Although the purpose of the imposition of an interest rate ceiling is to protect borrowers, 
it can lead to various consequences in the financial sector. Various studies have examined these 
effects. Research focusing on developed countries include Blitz and Long (1965), Villegas 
(1982), Peterson (1983), Villegas (1989), Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010), and Rigbi (2013) 
                                            
2 The double-bottom-line issue can lead to the so-called ‘mission drift’ in microfinance. That is, MFIs 




for the USA, and Ellison and Forster (2008) for Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, 
and the USA. Alper et al. (2019) provided a detailed survey regarding this subject. Most of these 
studies documented the adverse impacts of the interest rate ceiling on the financial sector. Many 
studies also attempt to assess the impacts of the ceiling imposition in developing countries. For 
instance, based on a theoretical analysis, Gonzalez-Vega (1984) showed that the interest rate 
ceiling can lead to credit-rationing behavior among microcredit lenders in the agricultural sector 
in developing countries. Helms and Reille (2004) indicated the negative impacts of the ceiling 
imposition on poor microfinance borrowers due to the credit rationing that results from high 
lending costs, in their analysis using data from 40 developing and transitional countries in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. In a study on the impacts of the law on financial services in Bolivia, 
Heng (2015) indicated the possible negative consequences of the interest rate ceiling on 
financial inclusion. In an analysis of the case of Kenya, Alper et al. (2019) found that the 
imposition of the interest rate ceiling leads to a significant decrease in the credit supplied to 
micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises and negatively affected financial intermediation. 
Madeira (2019) showed that the imposition of the interest rate ceiling in Chile in 2013 could 
have led to the exclusion of borrowing households from bank credit. Although studies on 
Cambodia are still scarce, some can be found. For instance, Crawford and Hamilton (2018) 
indicated that the ceiling imposition in Cambodia led to an increase of the average loan size and 
a possible change of MFI behavior towards richer borrowers over their lending. In another study, 
World Bank (2019) investigated the impacts of the ceiling imposition in a more detailed manner. 
It found that the decrease of interest rate is partly offset by increases in loan assessment and 
processing fees. Furthermore, it showed that the ceiling imposition led to a shift in the behavior 
of MFIs from providing small loans to providing larger loans with a longer maturity in their loan 
portfolios. However, these earlier studies on the case of Cambodia focused on the examination 




The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate the impacts of the imposition of the 
interest rate ceiling on microfinance loans in Cambodia, based on data and information from the 
borrower household side. Particularly, changes in credit cost, loan size, and loan maturity after 
the imposition of the ceiling are examined, and possible credit rationing and factors affecting 
household debt burden are also discussed and analyzed. Our results indicate that the average 
interest rate is reduced after the imposition and although this reduction is offset by the increase 
of the average loan assessment and processing fee, this increase is relatively small. As a result, 
the average credit cost declines. The average size of loans provided by MFIs at a relatively low 
level increases after the imposition; however, the change in the loan maturity is not statistically 
significant. This increase in the average loan size may be partially a result of the shift to larger 
loan size by MFIs in their loan portfolios. The increase in the percentage of loans from informal 
sources by a few percentage points after the ceiling imposition is also confirmed. This can reflect 
the possibility of credit rationing. Our logistic and probit regressions show that those in the 
relatively poor group have a higher probability of being rejected for loans. Furthermore, our 
analysis of the household debt burden indicates that a higher debt service ratio is positively 
associated with a larger loan size. Since we have confirmed the increase of the average loan size 
at a relatively low level after the ceiling imposition, this positive correlation might imply the 
possibility of an increase in the debt burden among relatively small borrowers. Finally, the 
evidence supporting the important role of financial literacy in alleviating household debt burden 
is also obtained.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical overview 
of the impacts of the interest rate ceiling. Some hypotheses are also proposed in this section. 
Section 3 illustrates the survey framework, including information on the survey sample and 
location. Section 4 presents the socio-economic condition of survey households, including basic 
household characteristics, monthly income, and expenditure. Section 5 provides results and 




2. Theoretical overview of the impacts of the interest rate ceiling and hypotheses 
In general, a financial institution charges interest rates on its loans by taking into account various 
factors such as the cost of funds, risks, and overhead costs, as documented in Miller (2013). The 
cost of funds refers to the cost that a financial institution must pay to their fund providers, 
including depositors for deposit-taking MFIs. Risks can include prevailing risk in the region in 
which loans are provided and household-specific risk. Overhead costs can consist of 
administration and other overhead costs for running offices and branches, network expansion 
and new product and service development-related costs, and loan assessment and processing 
fees. Furthermore, the loan interest rate of a financial institution may be influenced by the level 
of tax (i.e., corporate tax) prevailing in the sector, as explained by Ferrari et al. (2018), and 
economy-wide factors such as inflation, market competition, information asymmetry, and its 
profit margin target.  
MFIs generally deal with relatively low-income and small borrowers who, in many 
cases, live in rural areas. In general, financial transactions with these borrowers have relatively 
high risks and high information asymmetry. Given the relatively small loan size, overhead costs 
are also high. For these reasons, the interest rate charged by an MFI is generally higher than that 
charged by a conventional commercial bank. 
 
2.1 Interest rate ceiling and credit cost 
When the legal ceiling for loan interest rates is imposed in the microfinance sector, formal credit 
providers (i.e., MFIs) must charge the interest rates of their loans at levels no higher than the 
ceiling, in compliance with the regulation. This constraint can affect their behavior. In their 
financial transaction activities, among the factors affecting interest rates discussed above, cost of 




sector-wide exogenous factors faced by all MFIs.3 However, for overhead costs and profit 
margin targets, MFIs can have more direct control and can more readily adjust these. Given this 
and the constraint resulting from the ceiling imposition, MFIs may need to adjust their overhead 
costs to maintain their profitability. Among overhead costs, loan assessment and processing fees 
can be relatively immediately adjusted and are not subject to a legal ceiling. MFIs might increase 
loan assessment and processing fee if they must comply with the legal ceiling on the interest rate. 
As a result, for borrowers, lower interest rates resulting from the ceiling regulation can be offset 
by the increase in loan assessment and processing fee. This is summarized in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Although the imposition of the interest rate ceiling can decrease loan interest 
rates, this can be offset by an increase in loan assessment and processing fees. 
 
2.2 Interest rate ceiling, loan size, and loan maturity 
As discussed above, MFIs generally engage in financial transactions with relatively high 
overhead costs (i.e., high administrative and transaction costs). These costs are affected by their 
productivity as well as their transaction or business models, as discussed in Helms and Reille 
(2004) and Ferrari et al. (2018). At a given level of productivity, these costs are generally a 
decreasing function of loan size and loan maturity structure. That is, the administrative and 
transaction costs per unit of loan and per loan are higher for smaller size and shorter maturity 
loans, respectively. Given that productivity cannot be adjusted in the short run, the ceiling 
imposition may induce MFIs to adjust their transaction or business model by reducing small-size 
and short-maturity loans and increasing larger size and longer maturity loans in their loan 
portfolios to maintain their profitability. This can be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
                                            
3 In the market with information asymmetry between borrowers and MFIs, the relationship between 
borrower’s default risk and loan interest rate could be endogenous. However, in reality, MFIs screen 
borrowers’ risks, and impose interest rates depending on the risks. Thus, to some extent, the risks of the 




Hypothesis 2: The imposition of the interest rate ceiling can induce MFIs to shift to larger size 
and longer maturity loans in their loan portfolios.  
 
2.3 Interest rate ceiling, informal credit, and welfare of borrowers 
A rationale underlying the imposition of the interest rate ceiling in the microfinance sector is the 
need to protect borrowers from being charged too-high interest rates. The proponent of the 
interest rate ceiling considers this as a need to address market failure that results from 
asymmetric information.4 This view argues that a financial institution might be able to exploit 
its monopolistic market power to charge interest rates higher than the market rates, as argued in 
Miller (2013). This implies higher borrowing costs, thereby negatively affecting borrower 
welfare. This can be more severe if the credit demand at a higher interest rate level is interest rate 
inelastic. In this case, the ceiling imposition can improve borrower welfare if the ceiling rate is 
not set to a level lower than the market rate. However, if the initially prevailing interest rate is 
close to or at the market rate, the ceiling imposition can have adverse consequences, such as 
credit rationing by formal lenders. As a result, informal credit might increase. That is, borrowers 
who cannot access to credit from formal lenders due to credit rationing might then opt to borrow 
from informal lenders that are not regulated by monetary authorities. These borrowers will need 
to pay higher credit costs to informal lenders. This can negatively affect their welfare. 
Another rationale for the imposition of the interest rate ceiling is the need to adjust the 
short-sighted and time-inconsistent behavior of borrowers, as documented in Tsutsui et al. 
(2007). This behavior particularly occurs among those who have a declining rate of time 
preference in their intertemporal decision making. This declining rate of time preference is also 
called ‘hyperbolic discounting’ (Frederick et al. 2002). That is, they tend to value present 
consumption or borrowing more than future ones. These borrowers might underestimate the 
                                            





future loan repayment and borrow at high interest rates for current consumption. Such behavior 
can increase their debt burden, thereby negatively affecting their welfare. This situation can be 
more severe if their financial literacy is low. Financial literacy reflects the ability to process 
economic information and make appropriate financial decision and planning (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2014). In this case, the ceiling imposition can effectively help to adjust the 
short-sighted and inconsistent behavior of such borrowers. However, its effectiveness can be 
affected by the existence of informal lenders in the market and by whether all formal lenders 
abide by the ceiling rate in their loan provision, as discussed in Bizer et al. (1992) and Tsutsui 
(2007). If informal lenders widely exist, borrowers with short-sighted and inconsistent behavior 
might just shift to borrowing from informal lenders. Furthermore, the regulatory or supervisory 
ability of monetary authorities is also important in preventing such borrowers, especially those 
who have low financial literacy, from being exploited by lenders in general. Our discussion can 
be summarized in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3-1: The imposition of the interest rate ceiling on MFIs can lead to an increase in 
informal credit. 
Hypothesis 3-2: Higher financial literacy can reduce debt burden among borrowers. 
 
3. Survey framework 
This paper examines the impacts of the imposition of the interest rate ceiling on the microfinance 
sector in Cambodia by focusing on Hypotheses 1, 2, 3-1, and 3-2, as discussed above. The data 
and information used for our examinations are obtained from a survey of borrower households. 





3.1 Household categories 
To ensure that we have a sample with a sufficient number of households having access to MFI 
loans for the periods before and after the ceiling imposition, three household categories are 
considered.5 The first category, S1, consists of households mainly having access to MFI loans 
both between January 2012 and March 2017 (i.e., the period before the ceiling imposition) and 
between April 2017 and December 2018 (i.e., the period after ceiling imposition). The second 
category, S2, consists of households mainly having access to MFI loans between January 2012 
and April 2017 (i.e., before the ceiling imposition), but having no access to loans after the 
imposition of the ceiling. It is noteworthy that, in terms of accessibility to MFI loans, S1 
households are not likely to be affected by the ceiling, as they have access to MFI loans both 
before and after its imposition. For S2 households, although they might simply have no demand 
for credit after the imposition, there is also the possibility that they are affected by the ceiling. 
The third category, S3, consists of households from a general sampling process in our survey 
location. Table A1 in Appendix A summaries household categories and their definitions. 
 
3.2 Survey location and sample size 
Five provinces from four geographical zones in Cambodia were chosen for the survey, based on 
two criteria: the penetration of MFI activities and the number of borrowers as the percentage of 
the total population in each province. The five selected provinces are Battambang (from the 
Tonle Sap Lake zone), Kandal (from the Plain zone), Kampong Speu (from the Plateau and 
Mountainous zone), Kampot (from the Coastal zone), and Kratie (from the Plateau and 
Mountainous zone). From each province, two districts are selected: one is the capital district, and 
                                            
5 The criteria of a household having access to an MFI loan before or after the imposition of the interest 
rate ceiling is based on the contract date of the loan. For instance, if a household has a loan contract 
before the ceiling imposition on April 1, 2017, this household is considered to have had loan access 
before the ceiling, even if that loan maturity may last until the period after the ceiling. A loan whose 
contract date is April 1, 2017, or after is considered as a loan after the ceiling. This is consistent with the 




the other is a rural district with the largest number of borrowers among all rural districts in the 
same province, to ensure that we have households in urban as well as in rural districts in our 
sample. The proportional number of households selected for the survey in each district is 
determined by considering the proportional size of its total population across all 10 selected 
districts. The lists of S1 and S2 households in each district are provided by the Credit Bureau 
Cambodia (CBC) using a random selection procedure. Selected households are located across 36 
communes in the 10 selected districts. Figure 1 illustrates our survey location on the Cambodian 
geographical map. 
The survey was conducted from August 19 to September 20, 2019. During the fieldwork, 
for S1 and S2 households, our survey team visited villages in the selected communes and met 
with the village chiefs for identifying locations of selected households. In the case that the 
village chiefs could not identify the households, we sought help from the branch offices of MFIs 
in those areas. However, if the initially selected households still could not be identified from the 
lists provided by the CBC, a sampling method via the household network in the selected villages 
was employed to identify households that meet the criteria of S1 and S2 categories for the 
interviews. S3 households are randomly selected from the nearby villages of S1 and S2 
househlds. The number of households for the survey are 400 for S1, 300 for S2, and 300 for S3.  
For each selected household, we mainly interviewed the household head or the spouse, 
who are generally the decision makers in their family. Table 1 shows the number of households 








Figure 1: Survey location 
Source: Authors’ construction. 
Table 1: Number of households by district and by household category 
Province District S1 S2 S3 Total 
Battambang Battambang* 50 38 38 126 Moung Rueussei 41 30 30 101 
Kampong Speu Krong Chbar Mon* 22 19 18 59 Samraong Tong 78 56 57 191 
Kampot Krong Kampot* 12 9 9 30 Chhuk 43 32 32 107 
Kandal Krong Ta Khmau* 31 23 23 77 S'ang 90 68 68 226 
Kratie 
Krong Kracheh* 9 7 7 23 
Snuol 24 18 18 60 
Total 400 300 300 1,000 
* Capital district.




4. Household socio-economic condition 
In this section, the socio-economic condition of households is illustrated using the data and 
information from our survey. Specifically, household basic characteristics, monthly income, and 
monthly expenditures are presented and discussed.   
 
4.1 Basic household characteristics 
Table 2 presents the basic characteristics of survey households. Information on urban-rural 
classification for communes is obtained from the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of the 
Ministry of Planning, Cambodia. A commune is defined as an urban commune if: (1) its 
population density exceeds 200 per km2; (2) the share of its male employment in agriculture is 
lower than 50%; and (3) its total population is more than 2,000 (NIS 2015). Table A2 in 
Appendix A illustrates the 36 communes in our survey by urban-rural classification.  
From Table 2, overall, we do not find statistically significant differences across 
household categories regarding their basic characteristics. Specifically, about one fourth of 
survey households have IDPoor, and about one fifth of them have at least one member migrating 
abroad or to other regions in Cambodia.6 Household heads have an average age of about 50 
years, and about one third of them are female. Moreover, average years of schooling of 
household members is around five years, and the average household size (i.e., number of persons 
per household) is about four. The identical basic characteristics of selected households across all 




                                            
6 The ID Poor program was established in 2006 for identifying poor households in Cambodia in an 
effort to reduce poverty. Households are identified as poor or not, based on their socio-economic 
conditions whose information are obtained from regular surveys. More details on the ID Poor program 




Table 2: Basic household characteristics 
 
Household category 
















S1 24.75 18.75 29.25 49 4.3 4.7 
(number of households) (400) (400) (400) (400) (400) (400) 
S2 22.67 23 32 50.1 4.2 4.9 
(number of households) (300) (300) (300) (300) (300) (300) 
S3 23 21.33 34.67 49.9 4.2 4.5 
(Number of households) (300) (300) (300) (300) (300) (300) 
All categories 23.6 20.8 31.7 49.6 4.2 4.7 
(Number of households) (1000) (1000) (1000) (1000) (1000) (1000) 
T-statistic of t-test: One-tailed test 
(H0: S1=S2) 
0.6393 -1.3765 -0.7818 -1.3478 1.1642 -1.0492 
F-statistic of ANOVA 
(H0: S1=S2=S3) 
0.35 0.98 1.17 1.01 0.65 2.03 
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimation, based on the survey data. 
 
 
4.2 Household monthly income and expenditures 
Table 3 shows the average monthly income and expenditures of survey households by category 
and region. The table indicates that, overall, although the difference of the average income 
between S1 and S2 households is not statistically significant, the difference of their monthly 
expenditure is. Specifically, the average monthly expenditure of S1 households is higher than 
that of S2 households for the overall and urban area cases. Figure 2 illustrates distributions of 
monthly income and expenditures by household category. This figure also indicates a higher 
monthly expenditure by S1 households, given that the curve of their expenditure distribution is 
on the right-hand side of that of S2 households. S1 households also have a higher median 
monthly expenditure. For a developing country like Cambodia, consumption or expenditure is 
often used as an indicator illustrating people’s living standards, given that it is less volatile than 
income. Since S1 households are those that have access to MFI loans for both before and after 
the ceiling imposition, their higher living standards can somewhat provide an implication of the 




to be associated with better access to finance, although further study is required to identify the 






                                            
7 Previous studies investigating the impacts of the access to microfinance on various aspects of 
household welfare in Cambodia provided mixed results. While Phim (2014), Roth et al. (2017) and 
Chhorn (2020) showed the positive impacts of microfinance on income, expenditure and poverty 
reduction, Seng (2018a, 2018b) indicated the negative impacts of microfinance on household welfare in 
Cambodia. 
Table 3: Average household monthly income and expenditurea by category and region 
 
Sample 













S1 households 762 652 679 845 691 730 
(number of households) (100) (300) (400) (100) (300) (400) 
S2 households 544 783 721 423 608 561 
(number of households) (77) (223) (300) (77) (223) (300) 
S3 households 793 412 510 548 513 522 
(number of households) (77) (223) (300) (77) (223) (300) 
Total HHs 705 619 641 627 613 617 
(number of households) (254) (746) (1000) (254) (746) (1000) 
T-statistic for t-test: 
One-tailed test for all 
communes 
(H0: S1=S2) 
 1.8403*  -0.815 -0.3394 4.1194*** 0.7598  1.9774**  
F-statistic for ANOVA 
(H0: S1=S2=S3) 
0.55  3.38** 1.58 9.65*** 1.77  4.50**  
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. Average income and expenditure are cross-sectional average values in 
2019 when the survey was conducted. As a result, it is not necessary to separate the nominal and real values. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimation based on the survey data. 
16 
Source: Authors’ construction based on the survey data. 
Moreover, the statistical insignificance of the difference of monthly expenditure between 
S1 and S2 households in rural area may reflect the fact that the dispersion of living standards (i.e., 
inequality) among people in the rural area is lower than that in the urban area. 
5. Impacts of the imposition of the interest rate ceiling
In this section, the results of the examinations of Hypotheses 1, 2, 3-1, and 3-2 are presented. 
Our survey revealed that 58 households in S2 also have access to microfinance loans after the 
ceiling imposition, although our initial classification of S2 did not intend to include households 
having access to MFI loans after the ceiling imposition, using the information provided by the 
CBC. This may be due to the possibility that those households have access to MFI loans through 
their different household members whose information was not yet covered by the CBC. 
Furthermore, it could also be because of their access to loans from informal sources. 




5.1 Interest rate ceiling and credit cost 
5.1.1 Basic statistics 
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the average monthly interest rate and average overall loan assessment 
and processing fees before and after the imposition of the interest rate ceiling.8 For the average 
interest rate, the t-test confirms its decrease after the ceiling imposition for both loans from all 
sources and loans from formal sources (i.e., MFIs). For the average overall fee, while the 
difference of average overall fee-to-loan size ratio is not statistically significant, the average 
overall fee per loan increased. The average monthly interest rate has decreased from 1.82% to 
1.60% for loans from overall sources and from 1.82% to 1.57% for loans from formal sources. 
The average interest rate after the ceiling imposition is very close to the legal ceiling rate, which 
is 18% per year, or around 1.5% monthly. The average overall fee-to-loan size ratio is around 3% 
to 4% and has been almost the same before and after ceiling imposition, while the average 
overall fees per loan have increased from 28 USD to 44 USD for loans from overall sources, and 
from 30 USD to 46 USD for loans from formal sources. The results indicating a higher average 
overall fee for loans from formal sources should not be surprising, since loans from overall 
sources also include informal sources that generally charge higher interest rates but may charge 
lower or no fees.  
Table 6 shows the average fee-to-loan size ratio per month and average monthly 
effective interest rate before and after the ceiling imposition for loans from formal sources. The 
effective interest rate is the sum of the interest rate and the fee-to-loan size ratio. From the table, 
the average monthly effective interest rate for loans from formal sources decreased from around 
2.12% to 1.84% after the ceiling imposition.9 
                                            
8 Average monthly interest rates and average loan assessment and processing fees are average values 
across loans, not across periods. As a result, it is not necessary to separate nominal and real values. 
9 This result also implies a decrease in the real effective interest rate after the imposition of the ceiling, 





Generally, these results confirmed Hypothesis 1. That is, the imposition of the interest 
rate ceiling decreased the average interest rate; but this was offset by an increase in loan 
assessment and processing fees. However, the offset effect was relatively small, resulting in a 
decrease in the average credit cost for borrowers. 
 
Table 4: Average interest rate before and after the ceiling imposition 
Household category 
All sources (%) Formal sources (%) 
Before After Before After 
S1 1.8 1.56 1.8 1.55 
(Number of loans) (54) (241) (54) (232) 
S2 1.77 1.75 1.77 1.45 
(Number of loans) (60) (39) (60) (33) 
S3 2.68 1.65 2.68 1.65 
(Number of loans) (4) (94) (4) (92) 
All categories 1.82 1.6 1.82 1.57 
(Number of loans) (118) (374) (118) (357) 
T-statistic of t-test for all 
categories: One-tailed test 
(H0: before=after) 
2.0758**  2.6290*** 
Loans with zero interest rate are excluded from the calculation and estimation. 
*** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimation, based on the survey data.  
 
 
Table 5: Average overall loan assessment and processing fee before and after ceiling imposition 
 
Household category 
Avg. overall fee per loan (USD) Avg. overall fee-to-loan size ratio (%) 
All sources Formal sourcesa All sources Formal sources 
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
S1 29.2 46.1 30.4 47.3 4.4 3.4 4.5 3.5 
(Number of loans) (130) (444) (125) (425) (127) (442) (122) (425) 
S2 27.6 28.7 28.8 32 1.7 3.9 1.8 4.4 
(Number of loans) (140) (78) (134) (69) (137) (76) (131) (68) 
S3 27.6 45.7 27.6 47.6 7.3 5.5 7.3 4.8 
(Number of loans) (16) (200) (16) (187) (15) (200) (15) (187) 
All categories 28.3 44.1 29.5 45.8 3.2 4.1 3.3 3.9 
(Number of loans) (286) (722) (275) (681) (279) (718) (268) (680) 




-4.3194*** -4.3349*** -0.9626 -0.6589 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% significance level. 







Table 6: Average fee-to-loan size ratio per month and average monthly effective interest 




Avg. fee-to-loan size ratio per 
month (%) 
Avg. effective interest rate 
(monthly, %)a 
Before After Before After 
S1 0.46 0.29 2.43 1.78 
(Number of loans) (119) (424) (47) (228) 
S2 0.11 0.30 1.83 1.53 
(Number of loans) (130) (65) (59) (32) 
S3 0.58 0.37 2.72 2.09 
(Number of loans) (15) (186) (4) (92) 
All categories 0.30 0.31 2.12 1.84 
(Number of loans) (264) (675) (110) (352) 
T-statistic of t-test 




a Effective interest rate is the sum of monthly interest rate and fee-to-loan size ratio per month. Loans with 
zero interest rate are excluded from the calculation and estimation. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 0% significance level. 
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimation, based on the survey data.  
 
5.1.2 Credit cost and their affecting factors 
To compare the credit cost (i.e., interest rate and loan assessment and processing fee) before and 
after the ceiling imposition in a more adequate manner, regression analyses on the relationship 
between credit cost and their affecting factors are conducted. The regression equation can be 
expressed as follows. 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,                                     (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑦 is credit cost, 𝛽𝛽 = (𝛽𝛽0,𝛽𝛽1,⋯ ,𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘)′  is a (𝑘𝑘 + 1) × 1  vector of regression 
coefficients, 𝑥𝑥 = (1,𝑥𝑥1,⋯ , 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘)′ is a (𝑘𝑘 + 1) × 1 vector of the explanatory variables, 𝑢𝑢 is the 
error term, and 𝑖𝑖 indicates the observation.  
For the specification of the estimation equation, the main factors affecting credit cost 
such as household characteristics, loan characteristics, market competition, and common risk 
variables are taken into account. Household characteristics include household ID Poor status, 




members, number of household members (i.e., household size), household financial literacy, and 
gender of the household head.10 Differences in these characteristics can result in different 
household-specific risks and socio-economic conditions, which are taken into account by 
lenders in financial transactions. Generally, a household with higher risk faces a higher credit 
cost. Loan characteristics include loan size, loan maturity, loan collateral, loan source, and loan 
purpose. The number of MFIs operating and non-performing loan rates at the commune level are 
used as proxies for market competition and common risk variables, respectively. Dummy 
variables for controlling the possible effects of different household categories and regional 
characteristics are also incorporated into the estimation equation. Data used for the estimation 
are from our survey, except for the number of MFIs operating and the non-performing loan rate, 
which are provided by the CBC. 
For the estimation method, the quantile regression (QR) method, developed by Koenker 
and Bassett (1978), is applied.11 The quantile estimator of 𝛽𝛽 in Equation (1) is obtained from 




�∑ ∅|𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽|𝑖𝑖∈�𝑖𝑖: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖≥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽� + ∑ (1 − ∅)|𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
′𝛽𝛽|𝑖𝑖∈�𝑖𝑖: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖<𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽� �,             (2) 
 
for the ∅𝑡𝑡ℎ  (0<∅<1). The QR method allows us to examine the impact of explanatory 
variables at the different quantiles of the distribution of the dependent variable. This method is 
more robust than the conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) method if outliers in the data 
exist and when the non-normal distribution pattern of the dependent variable is observed. From 
Figure B1 in Appendix B, the distributions of the monthly interest rate and the fee-to-loan size 
                                            
10 Financial literacy of a household head or the spouse whom we interviewed is used as the proxy for 
household financial literacy, since they are usually the main decision makers in their families. Financial 
literacy is constructed by using survey questions related to households’ ability to calculate and 
understand the economic variables such as interest rate and inflation calculations. The ratio of the 
correct answers in all answers, which is between 0 and 1, is used as the measure of its level.  
11 In this regression, household socio-economic condition (e.g., income) related endogeneity issues may 
exist. Although this cannot be addressed with sophistication, various factors are controlled in our 





ratio obviously have non-normal patterns, and outliers seem to exist in their data. This motivates 
our application of the QR method. Tables 7, 8 and 9 present the estimation results at the 25th, 50th, 
and 75th quantiles, in which the monthly interest rate, the overall fee-to-loan size ratio, and the 








Table 7: Quantile regression results (dep. var.: monthly interest rate in %) 
Q.25th Before Before After After 
Variable (1-1) (1-2) (1-3) (1-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.26 -0.26 -0.01 -0.13 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.02) (0.36) ln(income)a 0.05 0.05 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) Avg. education of hh member -0.05* -0.05* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) ln(avg. age of hh member) -1.58 -1.67 0.95* 0.98** 
 (4.27) (4.33) (0.51) (0.49) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) 0.27 0.28 -0.15* -0.15** 
 (0.62) (0.62) (0.08) (0.07) Household size -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) Financial literacy -0.21 -0.21 0.03 0.03 
 (0.33) (0.34) (0.05) (0.05) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.01 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.02) (0.02) ln(loan size) -0.00 -0.00 -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) Loan maturity -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Land as collateral -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.02) (0.02) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0)b - - -0.06 -0.06 
 - - (0.19) (0.24) Productive and durable goods purpose  -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.11) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  -0.50* -0.51 -0.07* -0.08* 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.30) (0.31) (0.04) (0.04) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)c -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) -0.25 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.94) (1.03) (0.03) (0.03) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) -0.04 0.24 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.95) (1.03) (0.04) (0.04) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) 0.33* 0.33* -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.04) (0.04) ID Poor*Formal source  -  0.12 
  -  (0.36) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -0.02  -0.06 
  (0.56)  (0.07) Constant 4.38 4.27 0.42 0.37 
  (7.34) (7.42) (0.85) (0.84) 
Number of observations 110 110 368 368 
Pseudo-R2 0.133 0.133 0.178 0.180 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Coefficients of ‘formal source’ in Columns (1-1) and (1-2) and the coefficient of ‘IDPoor* Formal source’ in Column  
(1-2) cannot be estimated, due to collinearity. 
c Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30-day overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error.  





Table 7 (cont.): Quantile regression results (dep. var.: monthly interest rate in %) 
Q.50th Before Before After After 
Variable (2-1) (2-2) (2-3) (2-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.17 -0.17 -0.01 -0.55 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.02) (0.36) ln(income)a -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) Avg. education of hh member -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) ln(avg. age of hh member) -2.89 -1.42 0.43 0.35 
 (4.61) (4.68) (0.44) (0.44) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) 0.45 0.22 -0.07 -0.05 
 (0.67) (0.68) (0.06) (0.07) Household size -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) Financial literacy -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 
 (0.44) (0.45) (0.04) (0.04) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.29 0.29 0.01 0.01 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.02) (0.02) ln(loan size) -0.05 -0.08 -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) Loan maturity -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Land as collateral -0.03 -0.06 0.04* 0.04* 
 (0.39) (0.45) (0.02) (0.02) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0)b - - -0.38** -0.38 
 - - (0.18) (0.24) Productive and durable goods purpose  -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.14) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  -0.16 -0.16 -0.05* -0.06* 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.33) (0.35) (0.03) (0.03) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)c -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) -1.27 -1.30 -0.00 -0.00 
 (1.19) (1.28) (0.02) (0.02) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) -1.15 -1.18 -0.03 -0.03 
 (1.19) (1.28) (0.04) (0.04) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.01 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.03) (0.04) ID Poor*Formal sourceb  -  0.54 
  -  (0.36) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -0.17  -0.00 
  (0.72)  (0.05) Constant 8.36 6.17 1.60** 1.72** 
  (7.72) (7.95) (0.72) (0.75) 
Number of observations 110 110 368 368 
Pseudo-R2 0.085 0.086 0.045 0.045 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Coefficients of ‘formal source’ in Columns (2-1) and (2-2) and the coefficient of ‘IDPoor*Formal source’ in Column  
(2-2) cannot be estimated, due to collinearity. 
c Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 





Table 7 (cont.): Quantile regression results (dep. var.: monthly interest rate in %) 
Q.75th Before Before After After 
Variable (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.23 0.04 -0.00 -0.60 
 (0.41) (0.47) (0.03) (1.18) ln(income)a 0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) Avg. education of hh member -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) ln(avg. age of hh member) 1.22 3.14 -0.00 0.00 
 (8.46) (8.36) (0.84) (0.82) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) -0.14 -0.42 0.00 -0.00 
 (1.21) (1.19) (0.12) (0.12) Household size 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01) Financial literacy 0.39 0.17 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.72) (0.74) (0.06) (0.06) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.64* 0.41 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.04) (0.04) ln(loan size) -0.29 -0.24 0.00 0.00 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) Loan maturity 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Land as collateral 0.14 -0.34 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.54) (0.58) (0.07) (0.07) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0)b - - -1.00 -1.00 
 - - (0.88) (1.15) Productive and durable goods purpose  0.19 0.06 0.00 0.00 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.32) (0.33) (0.03) (0.02) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  0.10 0.10 -0.00 -0.00 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.58) (0.60) (0.05) (0.05) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)c -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) -0.15 -1.49 0.00 0.00 
 (1.32) (1.38) (0.04) (0.04) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) -0.25 -1.60 -0.00 0.00 
 (1.31) (1.38) (0.07) (0.07) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) -0.18 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.47) (0.50) (0.07) (0.11) ID Poor*Formal sourceb  -  0.60 
  -  (1.17) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -1.18  -0.00 
  (1.12)  (0.16) Constant 1.29 0.36 2.50 2.50 
  (14.68) (14.49) (1.53) (1.68) 
Number of observations 110 110 368 368 
Pseudo-R2 0.175 0.191 0.045 0.049 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Coefficients of ‘formal source’ in Columns (3-1) and (3-2) and the coefficient of ‘IDPoor*Formal source’ in Column 
(3-2) cannot be estimated, due to collinearity. 
c Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 





Table 8: Quantile regression results (dep. var.: overall fee-to-loan size ratio, %) 
Q.25th Before Before After After 
Variable (1-1) (1-2) (1-3) (1-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.29 
 (0.12) (0.32) (0.11) (2.59) ln(income)a -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) Avg. education of hh member -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) ln(avg. age of hh member) 3.38 3.08 -3.49 -2.82 
 (3.35) (3.45) (2.14) (2.19) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) -0.56 -0.52 0.47 0.37 
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.30) (0.31) Household size -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) Financial literacy 0.37 0.36 -0.06 -0.12 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.07 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) ln(loan size) -0.14* -0.15* -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) Loan maturity -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Land as collateral 0.23 0.24 0.11 0.09 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.17) (0.17) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0) 0.66* 0.66 0.23 0.37 
 (0.38) (0.41) (0.22) (0.26) Productive and durable goods purpose  -0.08 -0.08 0.12 0.14* 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  -0.14 -0.11 0.03 0.10 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.20) (0.21) (0.10) (0.10) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)b -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) 0.24 0.22 0.11 0.12 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.08) (0.09) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.10) (0.11) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) -0.42*** -0.41** 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.09) (0.10) ID Poor*Formal source  -0.06  -0.36 
  (0.36)  (2.59) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  0.15  0.04 
  (0.40)  (0.32) Constant -3.81 -3.28 6.38* 5.26 
  (5.67) (5.85) (3.73) (3.83) 
Number of observations 266 266 700 700 
Pseudo-R2 0.038 0.038 0.008 0.008 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 





Table 8 (cont.): Quantile regression results (dep. var.: overall fee-to-loan size ratio, %) 
Q.50th Before Before After After 
Variable (2-1) (2-2) (2-3) (2-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.04 0.01 0.21 1.25 
 (0.13) (0.47) (0.19) (8.40) ln(income)a 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) Avg. education of hh member -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) ln(avg. age of hh member) -2.79 -2.52 -4.98 -5.45 
 (4.79) (4.99) (4.75) (4.69) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) 0.33 0.30 0.66 0.73 
 (0.68) (0.70) (0.68) (0.67) Household size -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) Financial literacy -0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.10 0.10 -0.09 -0.12 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) ln(loan size) -0.35** -0.36** -0.56*** -0.57*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) Loan maturity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Land as collateral -0.22 -0.16 -0.20 -0.32 
 (0.83) (0.81) (0.36) (0.34) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0) 1.67* 1.62* 2.08*** 2.62*** 
 (0.89) (0.93) (0.58) (0.55) Productive and durable goods purpose  -0.12 -0.12 0.17 0.19 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  -0.21 -0.21 0.11 0.12 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.26) (0.26) (0.17) (0.17) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)b 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.07 
 (0.26) (1.01) (0.16) (0.16) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 0.05 -0.02 -0.49** -0.37 
 (0.25) (1.01) (0.22) (0.23) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.21 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.17) (0.17) ID Poor*Formal source  -0.03  -1.27 
  (0.50)  (8.41) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -0.05  0.29 
  (0.52)  (0.43) Constant 7.72 7.34 13.09 13.44* 
  (8.48) (8.89) (8.08) (7.99) 
Number of observations 266 266 700 700 
Pseudo-R2 0.043 0.043 0.046 0.048 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 






Table 8 (cont.): Quantile regression results (dep. var.: overall fee-to-loan size ratio, %) 
Q.75th Before Before After After 
Variable (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.55 -0.56 -0.18 7.36 
 (0.34) (1.45) (0.40) (35.07) ln(income)a 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.18 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) Avg. education. of hh member -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) ln(avg. age of hh member) -2.28 -0.17 -10.54 -7.46 
 (14.06) (14.77) (9.17) (8.81) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) 0.22 -0.10 1.48 1.05 
 (1.98) (2.08) (1.30) (1.26) Household size -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.08) Financial literacy 0.73 0.78 0.04 -0.06 
 (0.69) (0.71) (0.65) (0.62) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.16 0.25 -0.53* -0.51* 
 (0.42) (0.44) (0.29) (0.27) ln(loan size) -1.10** -1.00** -1.72*** -1.62*** 
 (0.47) (0.48) (0.22) (0.20) Loan maturity 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) Land as collateral -5.99** -6.05** -1.09 -1.25 
 (2.58) (2.57) (0.77) (0.76) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0) 8.66*** 8.47*** 1.64 3.87** 
 (2.46) (2.63) (1.85) (1.51) Productive and durable goods purpose  -0.21 -0.31 0.20 0.26 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  0.02 -0.17 0.56* 0.53* 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.79) (0.80) (0.30) (0.29) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)b 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.10 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.20) (0.22) (0.11) (0.11) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) 0.44 0.60 0.19 0.15 
 (11.99) (12.35) (0.33) (0.31) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 0.39 0.47 -0.77** -0.66* 
 (11.99) (12.35) (0.39) (0.37) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) -0.05 0.14 -0.03 -0.31 
 (0.63) (0.70) (0.42) (0.39) ID Poor*Formal source  0.10  -7.85 
  (1.51)  (35.08) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -0.45  0.86 
  (1.40)  (1.72) Constant 11.89 8.09 33.23** 24.85* 
  (28.45) (29.41) (16.06) (15.06) 
Number of observations 266 266 700 700 
Pseudo-R2 0.096 0.096 0.111 0.123 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 





Table 9: Quantile regression results (dep. var.: fee-to-loan size ratio per month, %) 
Q.25th Before Before After After 
Variable (1-1) (1-2) (1-3) (1-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.52) ln(income)a 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Avg. education of hh member -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) ln(avg. age of hh member) 0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) Household size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Financial literacy 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) ln(loan size) -0.01* -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Loan maturity -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Land as collateral 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) Productive and durable goods purpose  -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01** 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)b -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) -0.01** -0.01* 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) ID Poor*Formal sourcec  -  -0.01 
  -  (0.52) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -0.01  0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.01) Constant 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.17 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.15) (0.15) 
Number of observations 255 255 696 696 
Pseudo-R2 0.018 0.018 0.000 0.000 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
c Coefficients of ‘ID Poor*Formal source’ in Column (1-2) cannot be estimated, due to collinearity.  
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 






Table 9 (cont.): Quantile regression results (dep. var.: fee-to-loan size ratio per month, %) 
Q.50th Before Before After After 
Variable (2-1) (2-2) (2-3) (2-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.44 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (20.11) ln(income)a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Avg. education of hh member -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) ln(avg. age of hh member) -0.02 -0.02 -0.20 -0.13 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) -0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Household size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Financial literacy 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) ln(loan size) -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Loan maturity -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Land as collateral -0.01 -0.02 -0.04** -0.04* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0) 0.03 0.05 0.11** 0.15*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) Productive and durable goods purpose  -0.00 -0.00 0.01* 0.01** 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)b 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) 0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) ID Poor*Formal sourcec  -  -0.44 
  -  (20.11) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -0.01  0.01 
  (0.03)  (0.02) Constant 0.22 0.22 0.55 0.39 
  (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) 
Number of observations 255 255 696 696 
Pseudo-R2 0.032 0.032 0.007 0.009 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
c Coefficients of ‘ID Poor*Formal source’ in Column (2-2) cannot be estimated, due to collinearity.  
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 






Table 9 (cont.): Quantile regression results (dep. var.: fee-to-loan size ratio per month, %) 
Q.75th Before Before After After 
Variable (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.03 -0.03 0.01 5.50 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (183.87) ln(income)a 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Avg. education of hh member 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) ln(avg. age of hh member) 0.08 0.08 -0.58 -0.26 
 (0.97) (1.00) (0.56) (0.53) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.04 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) Household size -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Financial literacy 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.01 0.01 -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) ln(loan size) -0.06** -0.06** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Loan maturity -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Land as collateral -0.28 -0.28 -0.15** -0.14** 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.07) (0.06) Formal source (Yes=1, No=0) 0.38 0.38 -0.00 0.24* 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.61) (0.13) Productive and durable goods purpose  -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
(Yes=1, No=0) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  -0.02 -0.02 0.05** 0.06** 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Non-performing loan rate (%)b 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(2016 for before, 2018 for after) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 
 (1.08) (1.01) (0.02) (0.02) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 (1.09) (1.01) (0.02) (0.02) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, No=0) 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) ID Poor*Formal sourcec  -  -5.50 
  -  (183.87) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -0.01  0.00 
  (0.08)  (0.15) Constant 0.37 0.37 1.70 0.87 
  (2.07) (2.08) (1.13) (0.90) 
Number of observations 255 255 696 696 
Pseudo-R2 0.066 0.066 0.015 0.022 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
c Coefficients of ‘ID Poor*Formal source’ in Column (3-2) cannot be estimated, due to collinearity.  
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 





Using the fitted values of the monthly interest rate calculated from the 50th quantile 
results in Table 7, after ceiling imposition, the average monthly interest rate decreased from 
1.69% to 1.46%, which is well below the ceiling rate.12 If only loans from formal sources are 
considered, it decreased from 1.67% to 1.44%. These results reflect the fact that the ceiling rate 
is being effectively enforced, although only about 13% of our 1,000 survey households 
answered that they are aware of the interest rate ceiling policy.13 Table 7 also indicates that, after 
the ceiling imposition, the lower interest rate seems to be significantly correlated with a higher 
number of MFIs in operation, which is a proxy for microfinance market competition based on 
the results from the 25th and 50th quantiles. This finding implies that a higher competition among 
MFIs can result in a lower interest rate. Moreover, the table shows that the lower interest rate 
seems to be associated with a larger loan size and longer loan maturity. The overall fee-to-loan 
size ratio, after ceiling imposition, increased from 0.90% to 1.45%, using the fitted values 
calculated from the quantile 50th results in Table 8.14 As for the fee-to-loan size ratio per month, 
it increased from about 0.04% to about 0.07%, using the fitted values calculated from the 
quantile 50th results in Table 9.15 Given that the average monthly interest rate for loans from 
formal sources decreased from 1.67% to 1.44% after the ceiling imposition, this implies a 
decrease in the average monthly effective interest rate for loans from formal sources from 1.71% 
to 1.51%, which is almost at the level of the ceiling rate.16 
Furthermore, Tables 8 and 9 show that, overall, a higher loan fee seems to be 
significantly associated with a smaller loan size. It also has a significantly positive correlation 
with loans from formal sources. This positive correlation result should not be surprising. Formal 
                                            
12 Estimated coefficients in columns 2-1 and 2-3 in Table 7 are used to calculate the fitted values of the 
interest rate before and after the ceiling imposition, respectively.  
13 From our survey, three fourths of those who are aware of the existence of the interest rate ceiling 
answered that they knew about it from credit officers of MFIs. 
14 Fitted values of the over fee-to-loan size ratio before and after the ceiling imposition are calculated by 
using estimated coefficients in columns 2-1 and 2-3 in Table 8, respectively. 
15 Fitted values of the fee-to-loan size ratio per month before and after the ceiling imposition are 
calculated by using estimated coefficients in columns 2-1 and 2-3 in Table 9, respectively. 
16 This result also implies a decrease in the real effective interest rate after ceiling imposition, given that 




lenders generally need to follow various formal procedures during the loan assessment and 
processing that incur fees. Although informal lenders might not apply such procedures when 
providing loans, they generally charge higher interest rates.   
Our findings confirmed Hypothesis 1 and are consistent with the basic statistical results. 
That is, the ceiling imposition has resulted in a decrease of the average interest rate for borrowers. 
Although this was offset by the increase in average loan assessment and processing fee, the 
offset effect is relatively small, resulting in the decrease of the average credit cost for borrowers. 
Overall, these findings are somewhat consistent with those of the World Bank (2019) from an 
analysis based on the data and information from MFIs. 
 
5.2 Interest rate ceiling, loan size, and loan maturity 
Table 10 illustrates the average loan size and loan maturity before and after the imposition of the 
interest rate ceiling. The table shows that there is no statistically significant evidence of a change 
in the overall average loan size and loan maturity after ceiling imposition. Overall, the average 
loan size is around 4,000 USD, and the average loan maturity is around 30 months. Figure 3 
illustrates the distribution of the loan size before and after the ceiling by loan source. From the 
figure, the obvious difference of loan size cannot be observed as well. However, Table 11 
illustrates the statistical evidence on the increase of the average loan size at a relatively small 
loan level after the ceiling imposition, in the case of loans from formal sources (i.e., MFI 
loans).17 Our survey indicates that, among those households having access to loans before the 
ceiling imposition, 73 of them have loans with the size smaller than 1,000 USD. About 37% of 
these households have the ID Poor and their average monthly income is around 469 USD. This 
average income is lower than that of the whole sample shown earlier in Table 3. 
                                            
17 It is important to note that loan size may be affected by various factors such as improvement in 
household living standards and their demand. For a better comparison, controlling for its affecting 
factors is more desirable if the data and information are available. Therefore, our results should be 
interpreted with caution.   
33 
Table 10: Average loan size and loan maturity before and after ceiling imposition 
Household category Avg. loan size (USD) Avg. loan maturity (months) All sources Formal sources All sources Formal sources 
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
S1 3,621 4,665 3,746 4,970 30 29.8 30.9 30.5 
(Number of loans) (127) (446) (122) (429) (145) (448) (140) (429)
S2 4,020 3,721 4,181 4,046 31.7 26.5 33.1 28.8 
(Number of loans) (138) (78) (132) (68) (144) (77) (138) (68) 
S3 3,578 3,921 3,578 4,141 28.6 29.4 28.6 31.2 
(Number of loans) (15) (201) (15) (187) (16) (200) (16) (186) 
All categories 3,816 4,357 3,950 4,539 30.7 29.3 31.8 30.5 
(Number of loans) (280) (725) (269) (684) (305) (725) (294) (683)
T-statistic of t-test for all
categories: One-tailed test
(H0: before=after)
-1.3657 -1.4306 0.9414 0.8259 
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimation, based on the survey data. 
Figure 3:  Distributions of loan size for all sources (Panel A) and formal sources (Panel B) 
before and after the ceiling, formal sources only 





Overall, our finding could not strongly confirm Hypothesis 2 since the difference in the 
average loan maturity before and after the imposition of the ceiling is not statistically significant. 
However, the evidence on the increase of the average loan size for a relatively small loan may 
provide some implications for the debt burden among relatively small borrowers, as discussed 
later in the paper.  
 
5.3 Interest rate ceiling and informal credit 
Table 12 presents the percentage of loans from informal sources before and after the ceiling 
imposition. The table indicates that loans from informal sources increased by a few percentage 
points. Overall, this result confirmed Hypothesis 3-1 regarding the increase in informal credit. 
This could reflect the possibility of credit rationing by formal lenders, although more 
sophisticated study might be needed to assess this consequence, if more data and information are 
available.  
From our survey, among the 595 households who provided answers, 56 answered that 
they had experience being rejected for a loan by formal lenders after the ceiling imposition. 
Table 11: Average loan size (USD) by range before and after ceiling imposition, formal sources 
Loan size Avg. T-statistic of t-test  Before After (H0: before=after) 
less than 1,000 loan size 425 495 -2.3749*** 
(Number of loans) (67) (207)   
1,000 ≤ loan size < 2,000 1,243 1,254 -0.1987 
(Number of loans) (28) (92)  2,000 ≤ loan size < 3,000 2,114 2,209 -1.9631** 
(Number of loans) (44) (71)   
3,000 ≤ loan size < 4,000 3,052 3,086 -0.8529 
(Number of loans)  (31)  (52)  4,000 ≤ loan size < 5,000 4,156           4,086  1.0831 
(Number of loans) (16) (28)   
5,000 ≤ loan size < 6,000 5,023  5,037 -0.5506 
(Number of loans) (30) (54)   
loan size ≥ 6,000 11,217  12,127 -0.8161 
(Number of loans) (53) (180)   
***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 




Table 13 illustrates the reasons for the household experience with loan rejection in Panel A and 
household coping methods in Panel B. From the table, lack of collateral and too-low income or 
being judged as having too low ability for loan repayment by the lenders seem to be the main 
reasons for being rejected for loans. Nearly half of the households with experience of being 
rejected for a loan turned to borrow from informal lenders such as friends and money lenders.  
 
Table 12: Percentage of loans from informal sources before and after the ceiling imposition 
Household 
category 
% of loans from informal sourcesa 
Before After 
S1 3.4 4.2 
(Number of loans) (146) (448) 
S2 4.2 11.5 
(Number of loans) (144) (78) 
S3 0.0 7.0 
(Number of loans) (16) (201) 
All categories 3.6 5.8 
(Number of loans) (306) (727) 
T-statistic of t-test for all 




a Loans from village banks are categorized as loans from formal sources. 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% significance level. 


















Table 13: Reasons of being rejected for loan and households’ coping methods 
Panel A: Reasons % of householdsa 
Too small borrowing amountb 7.1 
(number of households) (4) 
Lack of collateral 30.4 
(number of households) (17) 
Having too low income or being judged  
to have too low ability to make loan repayments  46.4 
(number of households) (26) 
Other reasons (late repayment of previous loans, etc.) 7.1 
(number of households) (4) 
Unaware of reason 19.6 
(number of households) (11) 
Panel B: Coping methods % of householdsa 
Reducing necessary consumption 1.8 
(number of households) (1) 
Selling livestock (cattle, buffalo, etc.) 5.4 
(number of households) (3) 
Selling lands 5.4 
(number of households) (3) 
Selling durable goods (agricultural tools, motorbike, etc.) 5.4 
(number of households) (3) 
Borrowing from informal sources (relatives, money lenders, etc.) 44.6 
(number of households) (25) 
Other solution 1.8 
(number of households) (1) 
Do nothing 42.9 
(number of households) (24) 
Total number of households  
experiencing being rejected for loan 56 
a Households can be rejected for loans by more than one reason and they can also have more than one coping method.   
b Specific borrowing amounts were 200 USD, 250 USD, 750 USD and 1,000 USD. 
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimation, based on the survey data.  
 
5.4 Household characteristics and experience of being rejected for loans 
To examine the factors affecting the experience being rejected for a loan in a more adequate 
manner, logistic and probit regression analyses are applied by focusing on household 
characteristics. The regression equation can be expressed as follows:  
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖) = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖,                               (3) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃 takes the value of 1 for a household having experience being rejected for a loan 




(1,𝑑𝑑1,⋯ ,𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙)′ is a (𝑙𝑙 + 1) × 1 vector of the explanatory variables, 𝑣𝑣 is the error term, and 𝑖𝑖 
indicates the observation.  
The explanatory variables include main household characteristic variables such as 
household IDPoor status, household income, average education years of household members, 
average age of household members, number of household members (i.e., household size), 
household financial literacy, and the gender of the head of household. Differences in these 
characteristics can result in a different probability of being rejected for loans. Dummy variables 
addressing the possible effects of different household categories and regional characteristics are 
also incorporated into the estimation equation. The data used for the estimation are from our 
survey. 
 
Table 14: Logistic and probit regression results (dep. var.: loan rejection, yes=1, no=0) 
Variable Logistic Logistic Probit Probit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IDPoor (Yes=1, No=0) 0.34 0.34 0.18 0.18 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.16) (0.16) ln(income)a -0.23 -0.23* -0.12* -0.13* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07) Avg. education. of hh member 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) ln(avg. age of hh member) 17.02* 17.04* 9.04* 9.04* 
 (9.18) (9.20) (4.65) (4.66) Squared ln(avg. age of hh member) -2.67** -2.67* -1.41** -1.41** 
 (1.36) (1.36) (0.69) (0.69) Household size 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) Financial literacy 0.59 0.60 0.31 0.31 
 (0.71) (0.71) (0.36) (0.36) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.16) (0.16) S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.07 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.17) (0.17) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 0.71 0.71 0.39 0.40 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.26) (0.26) Urban commune dummy  
(Yes=1, No=0)  0.12  0.06 
  (0.33)  (0.17) Constant -28.95* -28.99* -15.53** -15.55** 
  (15.24) (15.28) (7.74) (7.77) 
Number of observations 581 581 581 581 
Log pseudolikelihood -172.637 -172.5783 -172.403 -172.351 
Pseudo-R2  0.051 0.052 0.053 0.053 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
The number in parentheses is the robust standard error.  




The estimation results are provided in Table 14. From the table, overall, the coefficients 
of household income, average age of household members, and its squares are statistically 
significant. A higher probability of being rejected for a loan is significantly associated with 
lower household income. Given that the sign of squared average age of household members is 
negative, households with too young age members and too old age members tend to face higher 
probability of being rejected for a loan. In general, households with too young age members or 
too old age members have a higher age dependency ratio. This can negatively reflect their ability 
to make loan repayments when being assessed by lenders. The evidence shown in Table 14 is 
thus consistent with the basic statistics given in Table 13. That is, low income or being judged as 
having too low ability for loan repayment by lenders seem to be the main reasons for being 
rejected for loans. 
 
5.5 Household debt burden 
As discussed above, the rationale underlying the imposition of the interest rate ceiling in the 
microfinance sector is the need to protect borrowers from being charged too high interest rates 
and the need to adjust the short-sighted and time-inconsistent behavior of borrowers. This can be 
a result of the concern regarding the debt burden among borrowers. In this study, although the 
sophisticated examination of the impacts of the ceiling imposition on debt burden cannot be 
conducted due to data and information limitations, an illustration of debt burden and an analysis 
of its affecting factors are provided, including the test of Hypothesis 3-2 regarding the role of 
financial literacy in reducing debt burdens.   
 
5.5.1 Basic statistics 
Table 15 outlines the basic statistics on the household debt service-to-income ratio and the debt 
service-to-expenditure ratio. These statistics are based on data from the survey on households 




of urban households is higher than that of rural households. This result may reflect the fact that 
urban households engage more actively in financial transactions, and their borrowing amount is 
generally larger. Moreover, the debt service-to-income ratio seems to be more volatile and more 
prone to suffer from the existence of outliers than the debt service-to-expenditure ratio. This 
should not be surprising, given the more volatile characteristics of household incomes compared 
to household expenditures in general.  
Figure 4 presents the cumulative distribution of the debt service-to-income ratio (Panel 
A) and the debt service-to-expenditure ratio (Panel B) in urban and rural communes. The vertical 
lines in both panels indicates 50% of the debt service ratio level. Overall, the percentages of 
borrower households having a debt service ratio of more than 50% are about 18% for the debt 
service-to-income ratio and about 5% for the debt service-to-expenditure ratio. These 
percentages are somewhat higher among households in urban communes.   
 
Table 15: Household debt service ratio 
Basic statistics 













Average 49.0 32.2 35.9 20.6 16.2 17.3 
Median 24.0 15.2 17.5 18.0 10.4 12.1 
Minimum 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Maximum 888.9 500.0 888.9 62.6 80.5 80.5 
Standard deviation 113.5 53.0 71.0 16.9 15.9 16.2 
Number of households 63 223 286 68 228 296 
T-statistic of t-test: 
One-tailed test -1.6677** -1.9678** 
(H0: Ave. rural=Ave. urban) 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% significance level. 











Figure 4:  Cumulative distributions of debt service-to-income ratio (Panel A) and 
debt service-to-expenditure ratio (Panel B) in urban and rural communes 
 
Source: Authors’ construction based on the survey data 
 
5.5.2 Household debt burden and its affecting factors 
To examine the factors affecting debt burden, regression analyses on the relationships between 
household debt service ratio and its affecting factors are conducted. The regression equation can 
be expressed as follows: 
                       𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 = ℎ𝑖𝑖′𝜃𝜃 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖,                                       (4) 
where 𝑧𝑧 is the household debt service ratio, 𝜃𝜃 = (𝜃𝜃0,𝜃𝜃1,⋯ ,𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚)′ is a (𝑚𝑚 + 1) × 1  
vector of regression coefficients, ℎ = (1,ℎ1,⋯ ,ℎ𝑚𝑚)′  is a (𝑚𝑚 + 1) × 1  vector of the 
explanatory variables, 𝜇𝜇 is the error term, and 𝑖𝑖 indicates the observation.  
Two debt service ratios are considered for the estimation: debt service-to-income ratio 
and debt service-to-expenditure ratio. The specification of the estimation equations takes into 
account household characteristics, loan characteristics, market competition, and common risk 
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household characteristics include household IDPoor status, household income, average 
education years of household members, average age of household members, number of 
household members (i.e., household size), household financial literacy, and the gender of the 
household head. Loan characteristics include loan size and the percentage of informal-source 
loans possessed by borrower households in the total loan numbers. As proxy variables for the 
market competition and common risk variables, the number of MFIs operating and 
non-performing loan rates at the commune level is used. To control for the possible effects of 
different household categories and regional characteristics, household category, and regional 
dummy variables are also included in the estimation equation. Except for the number of MFIs 
operating and non-performing loan rate which are provided by the CBC, all data are from our 
survey. For the estimation method, like the cause of credit cost analyses, we apply the QR 
method that allows us to examine the factors affecting the debt service ratio at different quantiles 
of its distribution.18 Figure B2 in Appendix B also motivates our application of the QR method. 
From the figure, the distributions of dependent variables, debt service-to-income ratio, (Panel A) 
and debt service-to-expenditure ratio (Panel B) obviously have non-normal patterns, and outliers 
may also exist in their data, especially for the former. Table 16 presents the estimation results at 
the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles of the dependent variable. 
  
                                            
18 In this regression, household characteristic (e.g., income) related endogeneity issues may exist. 
Although this cannot be addressed with sophistication, various factors are controlled in our estimation 




Table 16: Quantile regression results (dep. var.: debt service ratio, %) 
(Q.25th) Debt service-to- Debt service-to- Debt service-to- Debt service-to- 
Variable income ratio income ratio expenditure ratio expenditure ratio 
  (1-1) (1-2) (1-3) (1-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -0.38 -0.30 -0.30 -0.09 
 (2.58) (3.03) (1.58) (1.75) ln(income)a -6.67*** -6.68*** -0.85 -1.02 
 (1.81) (1.85) (0.62) (0.67) Avg. education of hh member -0.31 -0.27 -0.41 -0.37 
 (0.48) (0.51) (0.26) (0.29) ln(avg. age. of hh member) -21.45 -24.37 -70.21* -71.89* 
 (70.09) (72.48) (41.96) (42.43) Squared ln(avg. age. of hh 
member) 3.22 3.57 10.89* 11.22* 
 (10.24) (10.57) (6.18) (6.26) Household size -0.10 -0.16 -0.26 -0.30 
 (0.58) (0.61) (0.27) (0.29) Financial literacy -0.84 -0.61 -3.51 -2.98 
 (5.52) (5.77) (2.61) (2.80) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 4.25* 4.32* 2.39* 2.29 
 (2.44) (2.58) (1.41) (1.52) ln(avg. loan size) 5.64*** 5.61*** 2.82*** 2.87*** 
 (1.40) (1.47) (0.59) (0.65) % of informal-source loans in 
total loan numbers 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) Number of MFI loans per 100 
hhs in 2018 8.15*** 8.61** 7.57*** 7.49*** 
 (3.09) (3.41) (2.16) (2.28) Non-performing loan rate (%) in 
2018b 0.76 0.83 0.83* 0.88* 
 (0.81) (0.85) (0.43) (0.45) S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) -0.25 0.31 -2.61* -2.69* 
 (2.79) (2.94) (1.48) (1.53) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 4.26 5.29 1.99 1.63 
 (5.04) (5.33) (3.11) (3.28) Urban commune dummy 
(Yes=1, No=0) 1.22 0.80 0.11 0.86 
 (4.06) (5.11) (1.72) (2.53) ID Poor*% of informal-source 
loan  0.09  0.03 
  (0.14)  (0.08) ID Poor*Urban commune 
dummy  1.42  -1.47 
  (7.73)  (4.05) Constant 33.41 38.47 97.68 100.00 
  (117.40) (121.19) (69.66) (70.13) 
Number of observations 235 235 235 235 
Pseudo-R2 0.113 0.115 0.155 0.157 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 





Table 16 (cont.): Quantile regression results (dep. var.: debt service ratio, %) 
(Q.50th) Debt service-to- Debt service-to- Debt service-to- Debt service-to- 
Variable income ratio income ratio expenditure ratio expenditure ratio 
  (2-1) (2-2) (2-3) (2-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -5.32 -5.85 -0.36 -1.85 
 (4.02) (4.66) (2.13) (2.71) ln(income)a -12.45*** -12.57*** -0.34 -0.51 
 (2.49) (2.56) (1.00) (1.04) Avg. education of hh member -0.61 -0.70 -0.53 -0.57 
 (0.76) (0.79) (0.58) (0.64) ln(avg. age. of hh member) 51.40 34.13 -95.53* -94.19 
 (114.11) (116.27) (56.19) (58.23) Squared ln(avg. age. of hh member) -7.23 -4.68 14.49* 14.13 
 (16.98) (17.29) (8.28) (8.60) Household size -0.43 -0.19 -0.81 -0.78 
 (0.93) (0.92) (0.59) (0.64) Financial literacy -2.41 -2.58 -11.61** -10.18* 
 (7.81) (8.34) (4.71) (5.18) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) 6.11* 6.79** 4.92** 4.47* 
 (3.15) (3.24) (2.39) (2.60) ln(avg. loan size) 8.80*** 9.21*** 3.98*** 3.84*** 
 (1.83) (1.94) (1.02) (1.12) % of informal-source loans in total 
loan numbers -0.05 -0.05 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs 
in 2018 6.62* 7.25* 9.01*** 8.81*** 
 (3.62) (3.76) (2.55) (2.65) Non-performing loan rate (%) in 
2018b -0.58 -0.40 0.49 0.41 
 (1.17) (1.20) (0.75) (0.80) S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) -0.01 -0.60 -0.47 -1.02 
 (3.57) (3.91) (2.47) (2.63) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 5.95 5.62 3.58 2.62 
 (7.65) (7.79) (5.90) (6.03) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, 
No=0) 5.90 4.27 -0.40 -2.26 
 (4.29) (5.45) (2.95) (3.82) ID Poor*% of informal-source loan  -0.05  0.01 
  (0.22)  (0.11) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  5.40  3.25 
  (9.23)  (5.61) Constant -64.85 -39.43 138.08 140.94 
  (186.91) (191.47) (93.76) (97.06) 
Number of observations 235 235 235 235 
Pseudo-R2 0.194 0.196 0.221 0.222 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 





Table 16 (cont.): Quantile regression results (dep. var.: debt service ratio, %) 
(Q.75th) Debt service-to- Debt service-to- Debt service-to- Debt service-to- 
Variable income ratio income ratio expenditure ratio expenditure ratio 
  (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4) 
ID Poor (Yes=1, No=0) -9.85 -9.78 -5.74* -6.24* 
 (7.01) (7.55) (3.27) (3.69) ln(income)a -22.00*** -21.75*** -0.83 -0.88 
 (5.57) (5.69) (1.60) (1.59) Avg. education of hh member 0.12 0.55 -1.06 -1.06 
 (1.84) (1.82) (0.66) (0.68) ln(avg. age. of hh member) -123.16 -63.02 -37.63 -34.20 
 (269.93) (266.13) (74.33) (70.61) Squared ln(avg. age. of hh member) 19.01 10.43 5.53 5.05 
 (41.37) (40.75) (10.64) (10.13) Household size -2.08 -1.89 -1.12 -1.04 
 (1.58) (1.55) (0.81) (0.83) Financial literacy -7.33 -11.62 -12.45* -12.31* 
 (12.78) (13.57) (6.99) (6.96) Female hh head (Yes=1, No=0) -1.76 -3.44 7.50** 7.60** 
 (6.26) (6.29) (3.26) (3.39) ln(avg. loan size) 11.18*** 11.27*** 4.76*** 4.68*** 
 (2.55) (2.58) (1.09) (1.12) % of informal-source loans in total 
loan numbers -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.07) (0.08) Number of MFI loans per 100 hhs  
in 2018 7.32 10.57 12.32*** 12.73*** 
 (10.02) (10.19) (3.83) (3.90) Non-performing loan rate (%) in 
2018b -1.17 -0.97 -0.12 -0.16 
 (2.29) (2.28) (0.90) (0.92) S1 dummy (S1=1, Other=0) 2.06 1.26 -4.31 -4.72 
 (6.52) (6.39) (3.20) (3.23) S2 dummy (S2=1, Other=0) 8.47 5.24 4.32 3.90 
 (19.51) (19.55) (5.62) (5.57) Urban commune dummy (Yes=1, 
No=0) 10.11 12.72 -0.85 -1.68 
 (9.67) (12.14) (4.98) (5.82) ID Poor*% of informal-source loan  0.56  0.01 
  (0.51)  (0.15) ID Poor*Urban commune dummy  -6.48  0.27 
  (19.88)  (9.03) Constant 288.29 177.71 58.14 52.81 
  (438.16) (432.81) (126.55) (120.06) 
Number of observations 235 235 235 235 
Pseudo-R2 0.211 0.216 0.295 0.295 
a Income from casual job, borrowing and heritage are excluded. 
b Non-performing loan refer to loan whose payment was more than 30 days overdue. 
Results are based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The number in parentheses is the standard error. 







Table 16 shows that a higher debt service ratio is significantly associated with a larger 
loan size. A 10% increase in loan size is associated with an increase of about 0.3% to 0.5% in the 
debt service-to-expenditure ratio. These results may have some implications. Since the increase 
in the loan size at the relatively small loan level is observed after the ceiling rate imposition, the 
positive correlation between loan size and debt service ratio might somewhat imply a possibility 
of the increase in debt burden among the relatively small borrower households. Furthermore, 
households with female household heads are positively associated with higher debt 
service-to-expenditure ratios of about 2% to 8%. The higher debt service ratio of households 
with female household heads reflects the fact that their income and expenditures are relatively 
low, compared to households with male household heads. It is worth noting that the higher debt 
service ratio (i.e., higher debt burden) does not necessary imply a negative effect on household 
welfare in the long run. Being able to access to more credit can lead to the increase of the debt 
service ratio. But if the credit is productively used, household living standard can increase, 
thereby improving their welfare. However, more data and information are necessary to 
implement a detailed examination.   
Overall, our estimation results also indicate that a lower debt service ratio is 
significantly associated with a higher financial literacy. A 0.1 increase in financial literacy is 
associated with about a 1% decrease in debt service-to-expenditure ratio at the 50th and 75th 
quantiles of the estimation. 19  This decreasing effect seems to be larger at a higher debt 
service-to-expenditure ratio. The evidence on the important role of financial literacy in reducing 
debt burden is in line with Liv (2013), which indicated that a higher financial literacy could 
reduce a borrower’s inclination for an over-indebtedness. Our estimation results confirmed 
Hypothesis 3-2. The significant results of the positive correlation between the debt service ratio 
                                            
19 As explained above, by construction, financial literacy level is between 0 and 1. A higher value 
reflects a higher literacy level. Average financial literacy of our surveyed households is about 0.3 in both 




and the number of MFIs operating should not be surprising, since a higher number of operating 
MFIs reflects higher household credit access, resulting in higher household debt service ratios. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The interest rate ceiling on microfinance loans was imposed in April 2017, in Cambodia. This 
imposition can have various impacts on the microfinance sector. Based on the data and 
information from a survey on borrower households in 2019, our analyses revealed that the 
ceiling imposition reduced the average interest rate and although this reduction is offset by the 
increase of the average loan assessment and processing fee, the increase is relatively small. 
Overall, the average effective interest rate (i.e., average credit cost) decreased. Our analyses also 
indicated the increase of average loan size provided by MFIs at a relatively small loan level, 
while the difference in the loan maturity was not statistically significant. However, the 
interpretations need to be made with caution due to the fact that controlling for other factors 
affecting loan size and loan maturity may be required.  
In examining the possibility of credit rationing, we found that the percentage of loans 
from informal sources increased by a few percentage points after the ceiling imposition. 
Moreover, the results from logistic and probit regressions indicate that relatively low-income 
households face a higher probability of being rejected for a loan. More sophisticated analyses on 
possible impacts of the interest rate ceiling on credit rationing among small borrowers should be 
done, if more data and information are available. In our analyses of factors affecting household 
debt burden, the results indicated a possibility of an increase in debt burden among relatively 
small borrower households and a higher debt burden among households with female household 
heads. However, it is also important to bear in mind that higher debt burden does not necessary 
imply a negative effect on household welfare in the long run, if the credit is productively used by 
borrower households. In our analysis, we also confirmed the crucial role of financial literacy in 




household financial literacy. In this regard, a detailed examination of factors affecting household 
financial literacy is needed. This is a subject for future study. 
Finally, a caveat that must be mentioned is that the selection of our survey location 
focuses on the penetration of microfinance activities in Cambodia and limited number of 
households were chosen for the survey, given time and cost constraints. A larger survey can 
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S1 Households mainly having access to microfinance loans both before and after the imposition of the interest ceiling in April 2017 
S2 
Households mainly having access to microfinance loans before the 
imposition of the interest ceiling in April 2017, but having no access to 
them after the imposition 
S3 Households based on a general sampling process  
 
 
Table A2: Survey communes by urban-rural classification 
 
Province District Commune (*urban) 
1. Battambang 
1. Battambang 
1. Chamkar Samraong* 
2. Kdol Doun Teav* 
3. Svay Pao* 
4. Voat Kor 




8. Ta Loas 
2. Kampong Speu 
3. Krong Chbar Mon 9. Chbar Mon* 10. Kandaol Dom* 
4. Samraong Tong 
11. Krang Ampil 
12. Roleang Chak 
13. Saen Dei 
14. Skuh 
15. Tang Krouch 
16. Thummoda Ar 
17. Tumpoar Meas 
3. Kampot 
5. Krong Kampot 18. Traeuy Kaoh 
6. Chhuk 
19. Boeng Nimol 
20. Chhuk 
21. Satv Pong 
22. Trapeang Phleang 
4. Kandal 
7. Krong Ta Khmau 
23. Kampong Samnanh* 
24. Preaek Ruessei* 
25. Ta Kdol* 
8. S'ang 
26. Kaoh Anlong Chen 
27. Kaoh Khael 
28. Preaek Ambel 
29. Roka Khpos 
30. Setbou 
31. Svay Rolum 
32. Ta Lon 
33. Traeuy Sla 
5. Kratie 
9. Krong Kracheh 34. Kracheh* 




Figure B2: Distributions of debt service-to-income ratio (%) (Panel A) and debt 
service-to-expenditure ratio (%) (Panel B) in urban and rural communes 
Source: Authors’ construction based on the survey data. 
Figure B1: Distributions of monthly interest rate (Panel A) and fee-to-loan size ratio 
(Panel B) before and after the ceiling 
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